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Abstract: This paper studies the labor market effects of migration-related supply 
shocks. We exploit forced migration caused by the Colombian conflict as a natural 
experiment to examine the impact of exogenous labor supply shifts on labor 
outcomes. While migration flows are exogenously produced by conflict dynamics, 
location decisions might be positively correlated with demand shocks. An 
instrumental variables strategy allows us to correct for the possible attenuation bias 
generated by internally displaced populations locating in dynamic labor markets.  Our 
results suggest that these immigration flows produce large negative impacts on the 
wages and employment opportunities of all workers, and are particularly large for low 
skill workers.  
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The perception that large inflows of unskilled migrants can deteriorate the 
labor conditions of a low-skilled native workforce in the host country has inspired a 
debate on the impact of migration. The evidence in the literature is mixed. Numerous 
studies have found that migration negatively affects wages and employment outcomes 
of natives, especially those least skilled, yet the magnitude of the effect is small 
(Altonji and Card, 1989; Card, 1989; LaLonde and Topel, 1991; Schoeni, 1997; 
Borjas and Katz, 2005; Carrasco et al, 2008; Kugler and Yuksel, 2008; Borjas, 
Freeman and Katz, 1997; Borjas, Grogger and Hanson 2006 and 2008). Some authors 
attribute the small effects to market adjustments, such as the outmigration of natives 
and the positive output of demand shocks, which conceal the large impact (Altonji 
and Card, 1989; Borjas, 1994). 
Establishing causality between adjustments in labor markets and immigration 
flows is however difficult. Presumably, migrants locate in dynamic markets with a 
growing labor demand, biasing the estimate of the impact on the labor markets. In 
order to solve the endogeneity issue, inflows of migrants have been instrumented with 
earlier migration flows from the same country (Altonji and Card, 1989; LaLonde and 
Topel, 1991; Card, 1989, Schoeni, 1997), or natural experiments are exploited 
whereby exogenous migrant flows are used to estimate the impact on labor markets 
(Card, 1989; Hunt, 1992; Carrington and deLima, 1996; Friedberg, 2001; Angrist and 
Kugler, 2003; Kugler and Yuksel, 2008; Lemos and Portes, 2008). 
The purpose of this paper is to determine the effects of large inflows of 
migrants on city wages, employment, unemployment, and labor force participation. In 
contrast to most of the literature that has focused on examining the effects of 
international economic immigration on labor markets of developed countries, this 
paper examines the impact of internal migration in a developing country. By 
examining labor markets of a developing country, this paper identifies the difficulties 
of labor market adjustments in rigid markets that are highly segmented between the 
informal and formal sector. Besides providing evidence for internal migration in a 
developing country, this paper uses a solid natural experiment, forced migration 
caused by the Colombian conflict, and an innovative instrumental variable, the 
massacres endured by the civil population in origin municipalities interacted with the  
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distance to destination sites. Because forced displacement is prompted by armed 
conflicts and chronic violence, the massive flows of migration generated is not 
responding to economic incentives, but instead migrants are fleeing rural areas in 
search of safety. This phenomenon creates an exogenous shift in labor supply, serving 
as a natural experiment to evaluate the effects of large labor supply shocks on cities. 
Despite being forced to flee from their origin cities, the decision to locate in a certain 
city might be associated with the economic opportunities the destination provides. For 
this purpose, we instrument the immigrant flows with an interaction between 
massacres at origin site and distance between origin and reception site. We believe 
this instrument corrects the bias generated by migrants locating in dynamic labor 
markets. 
Our results suggest that these migration flows produce large negative impacts 
on wages, and employment opportunities of all workers, but are particularly large for 
low-skilled workers. Due to the rigidities of labor markets in Colombia and the 
minimum wage regulations, adjustments of labor markets are slow and seemingly 
incomplete, producing a particularly large negative effect on wages and an expansion 
of the informal sector.  The distributive impact of forced displacement is considerable. 
Not only are welfare and assets losses stemming from forced displacement substantial 
(Ibáñez and Moya, 2008), the impact of displaced inflows falls heavily on the most 
vulnerable groups of the native population.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. Section two describes 
the empirical strategy. In the third section, we describe in detail the data sources and 
variables constructed. Lastly, the results from the main analysis are discussed in 
section four with the conclusions presented in section five.  
II. Empirical strategy 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the impact of migrant flows on labor 
market outcomes. We examine labor markets adjustments after an exogenous shift in 
labor supply caused by forced displacement in Colombia. Because excessive 
regulation and a binding minimum wage introduce significant rigidities to the 
Colombian labor markets, we also examine whether the impact of migration on these 
labor outcomes of workers differs across the formal and informal sectors. In addition, 
we identify the impact of migrant shares on the probability of being employed in the  
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formal and informal sector. By examining the impact on these probabilities, we intend 
to establish whether migration contributes to the expansion of the informal sector.  
The analysis draws on a two-sector model of labor markets. Minimum wage 
regulations, the large non-wage costs and the excessive regulation of the Colombian 
labor markets have contributed to a growing informal sector, and high unemployment 
rates (Kugler and Kugler, 2003; Maloney and Núñez, 2003; Bernal and Cárdenas, 
2003). Presumably, labor adjustments to migrant shares differ for the informal and 
formal sector, therefore assuming one sector may conceal the impact of an outward 
shift of labor supply. We identify adjustments on natives’ wages, labor participation, 
employment and unemployment, using an approach suggested in LaLonde and Topel 
(1991). 
We assume workers in the two sectors are not homogeneous such that most 
low productivity workers self-select into the informal sector. When the minimum 
wage in the formal sector is above the equilibrium wage, labor markets produce an 
excess supply of workers. This excess supply of the formal sector pushes workers to 
the informal sector, to queue for a job in the formal sector, causing unemployment, or 
to reduce participation in labor markets when the wage falls below their reservation 
wage. This is the case in Colombia where unemployment rates are high, the average 
of the last seven years is about 12 percent, and the informal sector accounts for 60 
percent of total employment. 
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) exogenously shift labor supply and cause 
an increase in the share of migrants. This in turn induces a change in the equilibrium 
conditions of both sectors. For the formal sector, if wages are equal to the minimum 
wage, a shift in the labor supply expands the excess supply obliging some workers to 
work in the informal sector, as well as increasing unemployment and reducing labor 
participation. If wages are above the minimum wage, wages may fall to the floor 
established by regulation. For the informal sector, an exogenous shift outward in labor 
supply, decreases equilibrium wages, and expands the number of workers in the 
informal sector.  
However, this increment in labor supply is not homogenous across all skill 
groups. The skill distribution of migrants, though diverse, usually diverges from the 
skill distribution of natives, implying that the skill group which increases  
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disproportionately is the most affected by the sudden expansion in labor supply 
(Altonji and Card, 1989). In our particular case, the skills of the displaced population 
are concentrated in the lower tail of the skill distribution, implying that an increasing 
share of forced migrants will impact mostly the informal sector. We expect displaced 
persons to be perfect substitutes for informal workers. Barriers to wage adjustments 
and the restricted ability of the Colombian markets to adjust to new conditions may 
strengthen the effect of the shock on participation rates and employment (Altonji and 
Card, 1989; Schoeni, 1997; Carrasco, 2008). Thus, we can expect large wage 
adjustments for individuals working in the informal sector as this sector is not obliged 
to comply with labor regulations, while quantity adjustments, such as a fall in labor 
participation and employment rates and an increase in unemployment, may emerge in 
the formal sector given that it is excessively regulated. However, as stressed by 
LaLonde and Topel (1991), IDPs are expected to assimilate to urban labor markets 
over time, entailing a greater degree of substitution as they assimilate, not only with 
informal workers, but also with formal workers.
4  
In order to identify the impact of the inflow of forced migrants on labor 
outcomes y for an individual i residing in locale c at period t, we use the following 
reduced form specification: 
(1)   ict ct
t
t











where  i X  are individual characteristics that influence labor outcomes such as 











ct Pop M 65 12
2001
ln  is the share of forced migrants at period t, γ  represents the 
impact of migration on labor outcomes, and  c β  and  ct β  are time invariant and time 
varying locale effects respectively. Labor outcomes ( ict y ) are hourly wages, labor 
force participation, unemployment, employment, probability of working in the formal 
sector, and probability of working in the informal sector. For all labor outcomes, we 
                                                            
4 Our data does not cover a large enough period to identify the long-term adjustments 
as the large inflows of displaced persons were fairly recent.  
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estimate the impact for the overall sample and for the formal and informal sector 
separately.   
We include locale effects to control for demand shocks, transitory fluctuations 
in demand or local amenities. For example, immigrants may produce a demand shock 
on the output markets, increasing labor demand and mitigating the negative impact on 
labor markets.  Two facts lead us to believe that a demand shock is unlikely in our 
case. Increased labor demand attributable to the rise in demand of locally produced 
goods generated by new IDPs might be small or negligible since on average they are 
close to subsistence levels. In addition, we are concentrating on the short-term 
impacts; thus, reactions from local labor markets are highly unlikely as firms do not 
have time to adjust (Altonji and Card, 1989). Despite expecting little reaction on the 
short-run, we include city fixed effects and city fixed effects interacted with years to 
control for any potential positive demand shocks (Altonji and Card, 1989; LaLonde 
and Topel; 1991; Schoeni, 1997; Kugler and Yuksel, 2008). 
Besides positive demand shocks, some natives may decide to out-migrate as a 
response to migration flows, mitigating further the impact of the newly increased 
supply (Altonji and Card, 1989; Borjas, 1994). The evidence on this respect is not 
conclusive as some studies find no evidence of out-migration, while others find 
particular groups may out-migrate in small proportions (Altonji and Card, 1991; Card 
and DiNardo, 2001; Kugler and Yuksel, 2008). Given that we are examining the 
short-term impacts, we can assume that outmigration is an unlikely response by the 
native population.  
The share of migrants is however an endogenous variable since migrants 
presumably select the city they migrate to based on the labor conditions that prevail. 
Most studies use geographical variation in the location of earlier migrants to 
instrument for the arrival of new migrants (Altonji and Card, 1989; LaLonde and 
Topel, 1991; Card, 1989, Schoeni, 1997). Other studies rely on natural experiments, 
such as the Mariel Boat lift, the repatriation of French citizens from Algeria or 
Hurricane Mitch, producing exogenous migrant flows (Card, 1989; Hunt, 1992; 
Carrington and deLima, 1996; Friedberg, 2001; Angrist and Kugler, 2003; Kugler and 
Yuksel, 2008; Lemos and Portes, 2008).   
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To instrument for migration flows, we also rely on a natural experiment: 
forced displacement caused by the internal conflict in Colombia, which has produced 
massive outmigration of populations from rural to urban areas. Intensification of the 
Colombian conflict during the 1990s heightened aggressions against the civilian 
population. Selective homicides, massacres, death threats, sexual violence, forced 
recruitment, and abductions perpetrated by illegal armed groups became frequent in 
rural areas. In order to prevent aggressions or after being the victim of one, the 
civilian population fled to seek refuge in urban areas.  Although households migrate, 
these massive population movements are not a response to economic incentives 
(Engel and Ibáñez, 2008).  Between 1998 and 2008, nearly 4.2 million persons, 
equivalent to 10% percent of the country’s population, were forced to migrate (Ibáñez 
and Velásquez, 2008). More than half the displacements occurred in a time span of 
four years (2000-2004). Forced displacement originates in nearly 90 percent of the 
Colombian municipalities, and the final destination of this population is dispersed all 
over the territory, providing a wide geographical variation.  In some medium-sized 
cities the displaced population was more than 20 percent of the native population. 
Despite being forced to leave, the selection of the destination site was completely 
voluntary. Different from other countries facing conflict, refugees were not required 
to locate to special camps, or to migrate to a particular city. Labor markets conditions 
could thus determine, at least partially, the decision to locate in a particular host city. 
This suggests that forced displacement is a natural experiment to understand how 
labor market adjusts to exogenous shifts in supply.  
Even though the expulsion of this population is not related to labor conditions, 
the decision to locate in a particular city may depend, at least partially, on labor 
conditions. We instrument the displacement shock using the number of massacres of 
civilian population perpetrated by illegal armed groups in origin cities, which captures 
the decision to out-migrate, interacted with distance to the destination municipalities, 
which captures the decision to immigrate to a particular city. The instrument is in turn 
weighted by the proportions that arrive at locale c from origin x. Equation (1) 
describes the first part of our empirical analysis in which we use micro data for the 
period 2001 to 2005 to estimate the effects of an increase in the share of IDPs on city 
wages, labor participation, unemployment, and employment.   
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The instrument is constructed as the sum of massacre-related deaths divided 
by the distance from where these massacres occur to the destination city, divided by 
the working age population at each destination city. 
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3. Data, Choice of Demographic Subgroups and Definition of Labor Market 
Outcomes 
Three different sources of data are used for this study. The first is the National 
Household Survey 2001-2005 (ECH 2001-2005 from its Spanish Acronym), that is 
representative of the 13 largest metropolitan areas. The second source of data is the 
data on Internally Displaced Populations (RUPD from its Spanish Acronym) from 
Acción Social, the presidential agency in charge of collecting information on 
displaced populations.
5 Data on displacement is available at the individual level, and 
provides information on origin and destination site, age, as well as on exact date of 
migration. The third source of data is the data on violence by municipality constructed 
by CEDE (Center for Economic and Development Studies of the Universidad de los 
Andes), which provides historical information on terrorist activity by municipality in 
Colombia.   
The National Household Survey is a repeated cross-section of household 
survey data collected quarterly by the National Statistics Department (DANE). It is 
representative of the 13 largest metropolitan areas. The surveys included in this paper 
cover the period January 2001 to September 2005. This particular period was chosen 
                                                            
5 The objective of RUPD is to legally recognize displaced households and thus quantify the demand for 
humanitarian aid. RUPD is a demand-driven instrument, wherein displaced households must approach 
government offices to declare, under oath, the circumstances of their displacement. After making such 
a declaration, government officials validate whether it is truthful and, if so, the legal status to be 
granted to the members of the displaced household.  
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because in this time frame the conflict intensified and displacement soared. In 
addition, data on internal displacement is believed to be consistent only from 1998 
onwards as the RUPD was launched in 1999, and only registered persons within one 
year of displacement. The National Household Survey collects information on 
household characteristics, education variables, and labor force information. Also, a 
special module on migration is included for the first quarter of every year.  This 
module identifies economic migrants and IDPs. The key variables studied include 
labor participation, employment status, wage (wage from main and second 
occupation), probability of working in the formal/informal sector, in addition to socio-
demographic characteristics such as age, sex, potential experience, and years of 
completed schooling.  
Hourly wages are constructed using the national household surveys, for the 
working age population (12-65 years of age) that have a complete report on all 
earnings, and are not currently attending school. For the purpose of the analysis, we 
perform estimations of the overall labor market and separately for formal and 
informal workers. Individuals that report working more than 100 hours per week were 
eliminated from the estimation sample.   
  To define skill groups, we rely on the official definition of formal and 
informal workers. Such definition classifies as informal employees and employers 
those who work for firms with ten or less workers, independent workers except 
professionals and technicians, domestic workers, and household workers with no 
remuneration.  
Also, we cannot distinguish between migrants and IDPs. In contrast to 
LaLonde and Topel (1991) and Card (1989), new IDPs are not only a substitute for 
earlier cohorts of IDPs or migrants, but rather we believe they are substitutes for other 
low skill natives. First, we concentrate on short-term impacts of IDPs as the large 
inflows of displaced persons were fairly recent. Thus, we cannot examine the impact 
on earlier cohorts of IDPs. Second, the skill-profile of migrants and IDPs diverges 
significantly. The skill distribution for migrants is above that of informal workers, 
whereas IDPs’ skill distribution is below that of informal workers. 
Wages were deflated by consumer price index March 1998=100 for each 
metropolitan area, and we control for cost of living across areas. Schoeni (1997)  
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suggests that regional price differences are strongly positively correlated with 
migration intensity, thus adjusting for these differences should eliminate any positive 
bias. Information on the monthly consumer price index by MSA is available from 
DANE, and used to deflate wages. Precise definitions of local labor markets are 
presented on Appendix A. 
Data from Acción Social is used to construct monthly migration shocks, as 
well as weights for our instrument. The IDP shock is constructed for individuals in 
working age (12-65 years of age), where the numerator is the cumulative number of 
IDPs in working age that arrived to each city and the denominator is the number of 
natives in working age.  
Finally, the data on violence is used to create the instrument which is the sum 
over time and destination of the total number of massacre related killings at the origin 
municipality divided by the distance from origin to destination city.  While massacres 
explain why people flee from a certain municipality, the variable distance is interacted 
with massacres at origin site as we believe that closeness to any of these 13 MSAs, 
rather than economic conditions explain, settling patterns. The following section 
describes our results. 
We expect the labor market responses to the displacement of both informal 
and formal workers to be different. Because the earnings distribution of the displaced 
population is similar to that of informal workers, we believe informal workers will be 
the group most severely affected by such migration flows, as the more directly 
competing for jobs. Graph 1 depicts the distribution of hourly wages for informal 
workers and IDPs for the period of study (2001-2005). The distribution for IDPs and 
informal workers is similar with the distribution for informal workers slightly tilted to 
the right. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows the distributions are not statistically 




Graph 1.Kernel Density for Real Wages – IDP and Informal Workers 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ECH 2001-2005 
  We decided not to divide groups by education-experience profiles. Given that 
a great bulk of the Colombian labor force classifies as informal workers, between 40 
and 60 percent of the labor force, neither potential experience nor education appear to 
explain why people sort in certain occupations, and therefore we concentrate our 
analysis on formal and informal workers. We also expect those at the bottom of the 
income distribution to be most likely affected by the effects of this migration.  
We group workers by gender. Female IDPs are better suited to compete in 
urban labor markets because their skills, such as cleaning, cooking or taking care of 
children, are more akin to some urban occupations. In addition, many females are 
obliged to become the main breadwinners of the household because their husbands 
were killed or abducted. Their household dependency ratio is large as a consequence, 
and reservation wages may be low. We expect the impact of the IDP shock to be 
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  The impact of migrant inflows on the different labor outcomes are presented in 
this section. We estimate impacts for wages, labor force participation, employment, 
unemployment, and type of occupation (formal and informal). All labor outcomes are 
estimated for the overall sample, and by gender. The impact on wages is estimated for 
the overall sample and for type of occupation. Our results suggest that inflows of 
forced migrants have negative statistically significant effects on city wages, and a 
positive and statistically significant effect on employment of the informal sector. The 
impact is particular large for informal workers who face drops in salaries between 1% 
and 2.4% for a 10% increase in the migrant share. In addition, immigration seems to 
be contributing to the expansion of the informal sector.  
  In the past 10 years, unemployment rates in Colombia’s 13 largest 
metropolitan areas have severely increased. This has been usually attributed to labor 
market rigidities that were exacerbated by economic recession at the beginning of the 
decade. As shown in Table 1, the unemployment rate for the period of study (2001-
2005) was about 17 percent for the 13 largest metropolitan areas. The purpose of our 
paper is to determine if supply shocks were a contributing factor to the deteriorating 
labor market conditions in Colombian cities. The 13 largest metropolitan areas in 
Colombia received about three percent of their labor force in a period of eight years, 
with some cities receiving more than five percent in the same time frame. The flows 
appear to be especially large for medium size metropolitan areas.  





Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Share of  
forced migrants 
2.99 2.13 0.03 13.21 
Employment  
Rate 
52.78 3.78 42.58 59.78 
Unemployment  
Rate 
16.97 2.70 11.06 25.90 
Labor Force 
Participation 
63.63 4.79 50.44 72.37 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ECH 2001-2005, DANE and RUPD.   
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  Our analysis indicates that in some metropolitan areas, the contribution of 
IDPs to the labor force follows the trend of the unemployment rate. Such is the case 
for cities like Ibague that is depicted in Graph 2. The growing number of unskilled 
workers in cities appears to be a contributing force in the increase in unemployment, 
especially in smaller metropolitan areas. Despite the appealing evidence in this graph, 
we need to control for other factors that may be determining the trend as well the 
behavior of labor markets, and correct for potential endogeneity bias. For example, 
although displacement and unemployment reached a peak in 2002, the deep recession 
the country faced in 1999 has been identified as the main driving force of increasing 
unemployment rates. However, after the one year recession, economic growth rates 
recuperated significantly, and labor reforms were put in place to lessen market 
rigidities.  Forced displacement, however, continued, and unemployment rates 
decreased, but persisted at high levels. The results, which are presented in the next 
paragraphs, reveal that unemployment rates in Ibague, a medium-sized city, follow 
the same trend as the share of migrants, which may imply that an increasing share of 
migrants contributes to deteriorating labor conditions.  
Graph 2. Quarterly trends in unemployment rate: Ibague 
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  Table 2 shows the unemployment trend in each metropolitan area for the 
period of study. It is noticeable that for the year 2002 unemployment was particularly 
high in all 13 metropolitan areas, year in which displacement flows were largest. 
Unemployment rates during this year ranged from 14.8% in Cartagena to 23% in 
Ibague. Displacement shares are larger in medium and small size cities such as Ibagué 
(6.1%), Monteria (6.61%), Pasto (6.63%), and Villavicencio (12.71%). However, the 
capacity to absorb migration flows seems to differ across cities. While unemployment 
and migration flows grew pari passu in Ibagué, in Villavicencio unemployment 
dropped and displacement increased significantly. Controlling for city specific effects 



















Table 2. Unemployment and IDP Shock by Metropolitan 
Area
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Four largest cities
Bogotá
     Unemployment Rate        18.65         17.91         16.69         14.64         13.26 
     IDP Share          0.34           0.87           1.23           1.60           1.99 
Medellín
     Unemployment Rate        18.06         16.99         16.14         15.21         14.65 
     IDP Share          1.18           1.93           2.18           2.55           2.96 
Calí 
     Unemployment Rate        17.87         15.91         15.28         14.18         13.11 
     IDP Share          0.53           1.12           1.42           1.68           1.87 
Barranquilla
     Unemployment Rate        16.02         16.62         16.31         14.95         13.56 
     IDP Share          1.35           2.67           3.16           3.93           4.46 
Other cities
Bucaramanga
     Unemployment Rate        18.22         20.04         17.87         16.69         15.19 
     IDP Share          1.51           2.74           3.20           3.82           4.37 
Cartagena
     Unemployment Rate        17.43         14.83         15.50         14.81         16.00 
     IDP Share          2.18           4.01           4.70           5.45           5.61 
Cucutá
     Unemployment Rate        15.37         17.17         17.49         15.79         14.62 
     IDP Share          1.31           2.94           3.55           4.09           4.56 
Ibagué
     Unemployment Rate        23.19         23.22         23.38         22.21         20.69 
     IDP Share          1.53           3.19           4.14           5.20           6.09 
Manizales
     Unemployment Rate        18.58         19.06         18.67         18.75         17.09 
     IDP Share          0.38           1.63           2.01           2.41           2.73 
Montería
     Unemployment Rate        17.59         17.02         16.08         16.70         14.46 
     IDP Share          2.71           4.78           5.39           5.91           6.61 
Pasto
     Unemployment Rate        19.82         17.79         18.45         17.96         15.09 
     IDP Share          1.94           4.54           5.49           6.17           6.63 
Pereira
     Unemployment Rate        18.50         17.72         18.09         17.11         16.07 
     IDP Share          0.92           1.95           2.83           3.65           4.09 
Villavicencio
     Unemployment Rate        16.17         15.56         14.13         12.58         12.17 
     IDP Share          2.10           5.62           7.52           9.49         12.71   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ECH 2001-2005.  
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  As opposed to international migration patterns to the US, the displaced appear to be a 
low skill homogenous group, and thus we believe they disproportionally affect the most 
vulnerable. The characteristics of the displaced population are shown in Table 3. IDPs are 
more similar to informal workers. However, they have on average less human capital, and 
appear to have different experience profiles from both the average informal worker and the 
average native. They are also younger, have larger families, and the head of the household 
appears to have more economic dependants. In addition, they work a larger number of hours 
and earn on average about 80 percent of a minimum wage. The poverty conditions of these 
populations are such that we believe that their reservation wage is low, and they would be 
willing to accept any job offer. The fact that they are willing to take any job offer entails a 
greater competition for unskilled workers, implying more substitutability with other unskilled 
workers at destination sites.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics comparing all workers, informal workers, IDPs. 
 
Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
Years of residence in locale  0-5  1.71 1.37             
Age 28.16 17.6 40.02 13.7 36.07 17.53
Age Head of Household  44.3 13.08 48.6 14.13 49.16 14.48
Sex (Males==1)  50 50 49 50 54 50
Married 33 47 57 49 46 50
Cohabitation 18 39 28 45 19 39
Number of People per Household  5.79 2.51 4.78 2.37 4.84 2.26
Average Years of Completed Schooling  5.34 4 7.56 4.19 8.5 4.24
Literacy Rate  88 32 96 2 96 2
Years of Completed Education of the 
Head of the Household  5.96 4.03 7.42 4.28 7.91 4.32
Years of Completed Education of the 
Spouse of the Head of the Household  5.69 4.26 7.14 4.55 7.77 4.68
Hours worked in first job per week  51.1 23.74 45.66 21.59 47.4 19.25
Hours worked in second job per week  0.12 1.69 0.37 2.93 0.25 2.34
Real Monthly Wage (COP)    232,594     242,296     245,440     384,606     334,610     562,647 
Wage in terms of the Minimum Wage           0.81          0.85          0.86          1.34           1.17           1.97 
Variable 
IDPs  Informal Workers  All Workers 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ECH 2001-2005.  
The first group of regressions will show the effect of the migration share on the real wages 
for the individuals located in each MSA. We defined the share as the cumulative population 
in working ages (12 to 65 years of age) received in a certain MSA since 2001 divided by the 
MSA population in working ages. We will proceed by showing the effect of the aggregate 
migrants’ share over the whole native workforce, in addition to the effects of the share of 
migrant on wages of both females and males, followed by the results on informal workers and 
formal workers that are in turn presented disaggregated by gender.  All regressions are 
clustered by MSA.   
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The first stage for the instrument is presented in Table A1 of the Appendix. The first 
stage shows a good fit of the instrument. We corroborate that by estimating the first stage 
only including the instrument. Results are presented in Table A2. The R-square for this 
regression is 0.40, showing the instrument indeed explains a large proportion of the variation 
in the share of migrants. Table A3 shows changes in the predicted share of migrants, 
evaluated at the mean, as the instrument increases by one standard deviation. As expected, an 
increase in the number of massacres by one standard deviation causes an increment of 6.72 
percent in the share of migrants. Map 1 depicts the distribution of massacres along the 
Colombian Territory. Although massacres are distributed all over the Colombian territory, 
occurrence is mainly concentrated in rural areas located near the economic centers, and the 
13 largest metropolitan areas, which corresponds to the cities examined in this paper.  
  Table 4 shows the effects of the share of forced migrants on the overall workforce. 
The first column shows an OLS regression with no year or city controls, the second column 
includes fixed effects for the city and the city interacted by the year, and the third column 
shows the result after instrumenting for the share of migrants. The results suggest a negative 
and statistically significant effect of the migrant inflows on wages. The effect is robust to the 
different specifications, and our instrument is correctly addressing the attenuation bias 
generated by IDPs locating in dynamic labor markets. The other variables have the expected 
signs, and are robust as well to the different specifications. The results suggest that a 10 




Table 4. Log Real Hourly Wage All Workforce 
 Variables  OLS  Fixed Effects  IV-Fixed Effects
   (I)  (II)  (III) 
Years of Completed Education  0.030* 0.030* 0.030*
  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001] 
Experience  -0.000* -0.000*  -0.000* 
  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
Experience Squared  0.132* 0.131*  0.131* 
  [0.004] [0.004]  [0.004] 
Dummy Married  0.032* 0.036*  0.037* 
  [0.007] [0.005]  [0.004] 
Sex (Female=1)  -0.082* -0.085*  -0.085* 
  [0.010] [0.010]  [0.010] 
Log Share of Forced Migrants  -0.074* -0.095*  -0.142** 
  [0.017] [0.018]  [0.057] 
Constant  5.267* 5.067*  4.875* 
  [0.080] [0.071]  [0.200] 
Observartions 741,562 741,562 741,562
R-Squared  0.357 0.363  0.364 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses   
+significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The dependent variable is the hourly wage of individuals not currently enrolled in school. (II) and (III) include 
city dummies and a time trend interacted with city dummies. 
 
  As a robustness check, we estimate the regressions using the first quarter of every 
year and eliminating both economic migrants and IDPs. We believe that economic migrants 
might observe the flows of migration, and select not to migrate, if they believe they will face 
high competition in a certain reception site, or they might decide to locate in other cities 
where IDPs represent a smaller share of the workforce. However, we know that economic 
migrants and IDPs differ substantially in their characteristics. Economic migrants tend to be 
younger and more educated, have smaller families and most have urban labor market 
experience. Thus, migrants will not directly compete with IDPs for jobs. Even if migrants 
could observe or anticipate IDP shocks, we expect the effects on their wages to be small, as 
they do not appear to be good substitutes. On the other hand, since IDPs fare poorly in labor 
markets, not eliminating them from the sample might reinforce the negative impact of 
migration. The results of the effects of the shock for the overall native workforce excluding 
economic migrants and IDPs are presented below (Table 5). The results, while smaller than 
those reported using the whole sample, are similar in magnitude to those reported on Table 4. 
In addition, the IV appears again to be solving the attenuation bias generated by IDPs locating in 




Table 5.  Log Hourly Wage - All Native Workforce 
 Variables  OLS  Fixed Effects  IV-Fixed Effects
   (I)  (II)  (III) 
Years of Completed Education  0.032* 0.031* 0.031*
  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001] 
Experience  -0.000* -0.000*  -0.000* 
  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
Experience Squared  0.132* 0.131*  0.132* 
  [0.004] [0.004]  [0.004] 
Dummy Married  0.039* 0.043*  0.044* 
  [0.008] [0.005]  [0.005] 
Sex (Female=1)  -0.077* -0.080*  -0.080* 
  [0.013] [0.013]  [0.013] 
Log Share of Forced Migrants  -0.063* -0.083*  -0.109* 
  [0.015] [0.008]  [0.034] 
Constant  5.296* 5.115*  5.004* 
  [0.080] [0.019]  [0.127] 
Observartions 190,870 190,870 189,388
R-Squared  0.366 0.373  0.374 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
The dependent variable is the hourly wage of individuals not currently enrolled in school. (II) and (III) include 
city dummies and a time trend. 
 
  Table 6 shows the estimations by gender. As stated before, displaced women are 
better suited to compete in urban labor markets as their labor experience is more akin to some 
urban low skilled occupations. Upon arrival to cities, the participation of female IDPs in the 
labor market may be larger. Graph 3 shows that, in addition, the assimilation of female IDPs, 
in contrast to male IDPs, is greater. Since time of arrival, there is a sharp increase in the hours 
worked for female, while for men the hours worked remain constant. The difference in the 
two distributions of hours worked is statistically significant for female IDPs, implying larger 




Graph 3. Hours worked per week by gender – recent and earlier migrants 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ECH 2001-2005. 
  The results corroborate this by suggesting a larger effect on female wages, which 
presumably is a consequence of a greater degree of assimilation of females to cities. The 
effect on wages appears to be larger for females as for males: a 10 percent increase in the IDP 
shock reduces female wages by 1.63 percent, and male wages by 1.24 percent.  We believe 
this is evidence of a greater degree of assimilation of female IDPs to urban labor markets, and 

























Table 6. Log Real Hourly Wage: Females and Males 
   OLS  Fixed Effects 
IV-Fixed 
Effects 
   (I)  (II)  (III) 
Females Log share of forced migrants  -0.100* -0.162*  -0,163 
  [0.020] [0.018] [0.104] 
Observations  329,251 329,251 329,251 
R-Squared  0.317 0.324 0.325 
Males Log share of forced migrants  -0.061* -0.073* -0.124* 
  [0.018] [0.021] [0.036] 
Observations  412,311 412,311 412,311 
R-Squared  0.391 0.397 0.399 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
The dependent variable is the hourly wage of individuals not currently enrolled in school. (I), (II) and (III) 
control for potential experience, potential experience squared, years of completed schooling, and a marital status 
dummy. (II) and (III) include city dummies and a time trend interacted with city dummies. 
 
  Because IDPs have low human capital, an inadequate experience for urban markets, and are 
similar to informal workers, they will most likely join the informal sector upon arrival. This 
implies that they will disproportionally affect the informal workforce, as they will be 
competing more directly with them for jobs. The results for only informal workers, and 
informal workers differentiated by gender are presented in Table 7. For purposes of 
estimating consistently the number of informal workers, we restrict the sample to the second 
quarter of every year for the ECH as information on informality is only collected for these 
periods. 
         Our  results  indicate that the effect of the IDP shock falls disproportionately on 
informal workers. An increment of 10 percent in the share of IDPs over the working age 
population will generate a real wage decline of 3.02 percent. As expected, since IDPs are 
better substitutes of informal workers, the impact will be greater than for other workers. This 
is exacerbated by the fact that the informal sector is not constrained by the minimum wage 
legislation; thus, an inflow of less skilled workers, with presumably a low reservation wage, 
will exert a high impact on wages as the results show.  
This impact is larger for female informal workers, who appear to carry most of the 
burden from the migrant inflows. While a 10 percent increase in the share of displaced cause 
a 2.63 percent fall in wages for male informal workers, for female informal workers this fall 
is 3.06 percent.  These results further support our hypothesis: the best substitutes for IDPs are 
informal workers, and thus this will be the sector most severely affected by the forced 
migration flows.   
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Table 7. Log Real Hourly Wage - Informal Workers: overall sample and differentiated by 
gender 
(Second Quarter 2001-2005) 
   OLS  Fixed Effects  IV-Fixed Effects 
   (I)  (II)  (III) 
Log share of migrants  -0.077*  -0.147*  -0.302* 
 [0.018]  [0.023]  [0.095] 
Observations 120,756  120,756  120,756 
R-Squared 0.167  0.176  0.177 
Females Log share of migrants  -0.100*  -0.162*  -0.306** 
  [0.018] [0.010]  [0.104] 
Observations 55,026  55,026  54,663 
R-Squared 0.108  0.12  0.12 
Males Log share of migrants  -0.053** -0.136*  -0.263*** 
  [0.021] [0.037]  [0.137] 
Observations 66,522  66,522  66,076 
R-Squared 0.229  0.24  0.241 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
The dependent variable is the hourly wage of individuals not currently enrolled in school. (I), (II) and (III) 
control for potential experience, potential experience squared, years of completed schooling, and a marital status 
dummy. (II) and (III) include city dummies and a time trend interacted by city dummies. 
 
  In the formal sector the effects of the migration shock on wages are zero, this is due to 
the fact that wages cannot drop below the minimum wage and therefore the adjustment may 
be in quantities rather than in prices. As shown in Table 8, the effect of forced migrants 
inflows is not statistically different from zero when we use IV. The effect of the shock was 
also evaluated by gender; however the results suggest that the shock will have no effect on 
wages of both males and females that work for the formal sector. The results are shown in the 




Table 8. Log Real Hourly Wage - Formal Workers: overall sample and differentiated by gender 
(Second Quarter 2001-2005) 
   OLS  Fixed Effects 
IV-Fixed 
Effects 
   (I)  (II)  (III) 
Log share of migrants  -0.082*  -0.093*  -0.143 
  [0.014] [0.007] [0.101] 
Observations  45,350 45,350 45,350 
R-Squared  0.506 0.513 0.514 
Females Log share of migrants  -0.069*  -0.134*  -0.183 
  [0.016] [0.012] [0.113] 
Observations  27,221 27,221 27,221 
R-Squared 0.44  0.448  0.449 
Males Log share of migrants  -0.079*  -0.071*  -0.164 
  [0.014] [0.011] [0.103] 
Observations  25,566 25,566 25,566 
R-Squared  0.506 0.513 0.514 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
The dependent variable is the hourly wage of individuals not currently enrolled in school. (I), (II) and (III) 
control for potential experience, potential experience squared, years of completed schooling, and a marital status 
dummy. (II) and (III) include city dummies and a time trend interacted by city dummies. 
 
In order to estimate the effect of the IDP shock on labor quantities, we estimate 
regressions for the probability of participating in the labor force, of being employed, and of 
being unemployed. The first stage for the quantity regressions are presented in Table A4. 
Table 9 shows the results. Besides reducing wages, the share of migrants decreases labor 
force participation and unemployment, while employment increases. However, the impact is 
not statistically significant for any of the three labor outcomes. As displaced persons are 
substitutes of informal workers, the impact on quantities may only emerge in informal 




Table 9. Instrumental variable estimations – Probability of participating in the labor force, 
being employed and being unemployed 







Log share of migrants  -0.010  0.003  -0.022 
 [0.032]  [0.033]  [0.013] 
Observations 1,495,603  1,487,965  984,645 
R-Squared 0.289  0.221  0.024 
      
Females Log share of migrants  -0.024  0.002  -0.012 
  [0.024] [0.042] [0.024] 
Observations 834,858  806,810  459,752 
R-Squared 0.205  0.157  0.028 
      
Males Log share of migrants  0.014  0.004  -0.026** 
  [0.044] [0.024] [0.009] 
Observations 660,745  681,155  524,893 
R-Squared 0.439  0.305  0.028 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
The dependent variable are a dummy variable indicating if the individual participates in the labor force, is 
employed, or is unemployed. (I), (II) and (III) control for potential experience, potential experience squared, 
years of completed schooling, and a marital status dummy. We include city dummies and a time trend interacted 
with city dummies for (II) and (III). 
 
 
The exogenous supply shift produced by the IDPs also contributed to an expansion in 
the informal sector. The results for employment rates presented in Table 10 reveal that the 
shock not only produced a significant drop in wages, but also quantity adjustments. As 
expected, employment increases in both the informal and the formal sector. However, the 
expansion in the informal sector is much larger than in the formal sector: a 10 percent 
increase in the share of IDPs over the workforce, increases the probability of being employed 
in the formal sector by 0.18 percent and in the informal sector by 0.27 percent. The impact 
diverges for female and male workers. While employment in the formal sector increases for 





Table 10. Employment in the formal and informal sector - by gender 
   Formal sector  Informal sector 
      
Log share of migrants  0.018*  0.027* 
 [0.004]  [0.005] 
Observations 241,416  255,719 
R-Squared 0.195  0.142 
Females Log share of migrants  0.017*  0.007 
  [0.003] [0.004] 
Observations 112,699  118,845 
R-Squared 0.225  0.166 
Males Log share of migrants  0.010  0.042* 
  [0.006] [0.007] 
Observations 128,717  136,874 
R-Squared 0.178  0.125 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating if the individual works in the formal/informal sector. (I), 
(II) and (III) control for potential experience, potential experience squared, years of completed schooling, and a 
marital status dummy. We include city dummies and a time trend interacted with city dummies for (II) and (III). 
 
The total effects of forced migration are sizeable. Between 2001 and 2005, displacement 
inflows increased by 200%. The total effects on wages are quantities from such increase, for 
the point estimates statistically significant, are presented in Table 11. As a consequence of 
forced displacement, overall wages fall by 28.4 percent, with wages for male workers 
decreasing by 24.8%.  The impact on wages is driven by a sharp drop of informal wages 
equivalent to about 60 percent, with a sharper fall for female workers (61.2%) than for male 
(52.6%). The effect on employment and the expansion of the informal sector seems less 
substantial. As a result of an expansion in the labor supply, formal employment for female 
workers increases by 3.4 percent in a period of 5 years. Displacement flows contributed by 








Hourly wages - total workforce  -0.142 -28.4% 
Hourly wages - male workers  -0.124 -24.8% 
Hourly wages - informal workers  -0.302 -60.4% 
Hourly wages - female informal workers  -0.306 -61.2% 
Hourly wages - male informal workers  -0.263 -52.6% 
Formal employment - female workers  0.017 3.4% 
Informal employment   0.027 5.4% 
Informal employment - male workers  0.042 8.4% 
 
The results show the supply shock produce a large effect on labor outcomes. Given 
the market segmentation, adjustments to the exogenous labor supply shock arise for wages 
and quantities. Wages fall about 1.4 percent for the native workforce for a 10 percent increase 
in the IDP share; wages for the informal sector drop by 3.06 percent; and employment 
increases by 2.6 percentage points. These estimates are larger than other papers that estimate 
the impact for labor markets in developed countries, where markets adjust rapidly to the 
shock and thus mitigate the effect. In contrast to labor markets in developed countries, the 
Colombian markets are plagued with rigidities that accentuate the negative impact of the 
shock. In addition, the effect of the shock falls disproportionately upon the most vulnerable 
groups of the population: informal and female workers. The large inflows of IDPs are 
producing a large negative distributive impact, which is exacerbating the effect stemming 
from the conflict.  
V. Conclusion 
This paper presents evidence on the effect of large exogenous supply shocks on labor 
market outcomes. The paper builds on a large group of papers that undertake similar 
approaches. However, we contribute in three respects. First, we use forced displacement 
produced by the civil conflict in Colombia as a natural experiment. The large immigration 
flows generated by forced migration are not related to labor conditions in the host city, but 
are the result of heightened attacks against the civilian population in the origin city. Second, 
we use a robust instrument: the massacres perpetuated by armed groups in each municipality 
weighted by distance to the destination site. While massacres explain the outflows of 
population from rural areas, distance to destination municipalities determine which city is 
selected by the displaced population for the final destination. Third, this is the first paper that  
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examines the impact of immigration on local labor markets of a developing country. Contrary 
to labor markets in developed countries, the excessive regulations produce inflexibility in 
labor markets, impeding a smooth adjustment when a shock arises. Our results suggest that 
the effect of a large inflow of less skilled workers is large. Not only do wages decline 
significantly, but quantity adjustments accentuate the effect. The point estimate from a 10 
percent increase in the share of IDP migrants ranges from one to a little more than three 
percent.  
We find that low skilled workers appear to be the most severely affected by the shift 
in the supply of labor, As the burden of the shock falls disproportionately on informal 
workers, which are directly competing for jobs with IDPs. In particular, informal female 
workers face the largest impact. Other papers in the literature of migration, suggest that 
particular groups are at a disadvantage, as they appear to be closer substitutes for migrants. 
Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2006) findings suggest that the bulk of the effects of increasing 
immigration are borne by African Americans, as increased immigration has reduced not only 
their wages, but also the employment opportunities in the legal economy. Similarly, our 
results suggest a great expansion of the informal economy, accompanied by a large decline in 
wages in this sector.  
 The distributive impact of the displacement is considerable. On the one hand, forced 
migrants faced large welfare losses stemming for the displacement process. On the other, the 
large inflows of these displaced population is affecting mostly vulnerable groups of the 
population. Besides contributing by further providing evidence on the impact of exogenous 
labor supply shifts, this paper shows the detrimental impact of civil conflict on its victims and 
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2.  Definition of Local Labor Markets 
For the purpose of our analysis we consider the 13 largest metropolitan areas. Each 
metropolitan area is comprised of the following municipalities: 
Medellín MSA: Medellín, Bello, Barbosa, Copacabana, La Estrella, Girardota, Itagüí, Caldas 
and Sabaneta.  
Bucaramanga MSA: Bucaramanga, Floridablanca, Girón, and Piedecuesta.  
Barranquilla MSA: Barranquilla, Puerto Colombia, Soledad , Malambo and Galapa.  
Cúcuta MSA: Cúcuta, Villa del Rosario, Los Patios and El Zulia.  
Pereira MSA: Pereira, Dosquebradas, and La Virginia.  
Bogotá MSA: Bogotá, Soacha, Mosquera, Funza, Madrid, Chía, Cajicá, Cota, La Calera, 
Tenjo, Tabio, Sibaté, Zipaquira, and Facatativa. 
Cali MSA: Cali, Palmira, Yumbo, Jamundí, Candelaria, La Cumbre Vijes and Florida. 
Villavicencio MSA: Villavicencio, Apiay, Acacías, Guamal, Restrepo and Cumaral. 
Cartagena MSA: Cartagena, Arjona, Clemencia, Mahates, María la Baja, San Estanislao, 
Santa Catalina, Santa Rosa, Turbaco and Villanueva.  
Manizales MSA: Manizales, Neira, Chinchiná and Villamaría.  
Ibagué MSA: Ibagué, el Salado, Buenos Aires, Cajamarca, Alvarado, Venadillo, Villa 
Restrepo, Piedras and Doima. 
Montería MSA: Montería 







Table A1: First Stage Regressions 
LOG(SUM(Massacre Victims/Distance)/POB12-65) 0.05                 0.06                  0.05                     
SE [0.0003861]*** [0.000524]*** [0.0005709]***
F-Test F( 66,741804) = 6060.24 F( 65,431619) =  3842.99 F( 65,341462) =  2418.38
 Prob > F      = 00 0
R2 0.94 0.94                  0.94                     
LOG(SUM(Massacre Victims/Distance)/POB12-65) 0.12                 0.12                  0.12                     
SE [0.0029451]*** [0.0038895]*** [0.003647]***
F-Test F( 186, 45295) = 51906.81 F(185, 25512) = 28830.99 F(185, 27167) = 31774.31
 Prob > F      = 00 0
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97
LOG(SUM(Massacre Victims/Distance)/POB12-65) 0.16                 0.17                  0.16                     
SE [0.0012815]*** [0.001753]*** [0.0018796]***
F-Test F(186,131483) = 40148.86 F(185, 71835) = 19635.26 F(185, 59463) = 21408.24
 Prob > F      = 00 0
R2 0.98                 0.98                  0.98                     
LOG(SUM(Massacre Victims/Distance)/POB12-65) 0.05                 0.05                  0.05                     
SE [0.0002719]*** [0.0003321]*** [.0003321]***
F-Test F( 66,1495536) =        F( 66,984578) = F( 66,984578) =       
 Prob > F      = 00 0
R2 0.94                 0.94                  0.94                     
Participation Employment Unemployment
All Informal Informal Males Informal Females
All Workers Males Females
All Formal Formal Males Formal Females
 
Note: For all regressions we do a Hausmann-Wu test comparing the IV estimates to the OLS estimates, to test for the validity of the instrument.  
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Robust standard errors in brackets 
"*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Table A3.A: Descriptive statistics – Instrument and Share of Migrants 
Effect on an increase of one standard deviation of the instrument on the log share of 
forced migrants 
 
Variable Mean Standard  Deviation 
Migrant share  0.0232146  0.0166387 
Instrument (in Logs)  -18.63355  1.25241 
Massacres per month 
Massacre deaths 
1.142623  
6.936066        
0.4523099 
5.899613           
Authors’ calculations, criminality dataset (CEDE)  
 
Table A3.B: Effect of an Increase of 1 Standard Deviation of the Instrument on the 
Share of Migrants 




1 S.D  -4.03  0.018 
2 S.D  -3.97  0.019 
3 S.D  -3.90  0.020 








Map 1. Deaths per Massacre (1988-2008) 
 
 
Barranquilla          
         
C a r t a g e n a           
Montería                 Bucaramanga  Cúcuta 
Medellín          Bogotá 
 





                        Villavicencio 





Source: Authors’ calculations base on CEDE database (1988-2008). 
Note: For the period of study (2001-2005) there is on average a massacre per day. 
Number of Deaths per 
Massacre 